In this paper, we design the so called "Strong Diffie-Hellman-Exponential-Schnnor Key Exchange (called SDH-XS-KE)" over Elliptic curves. SDH-XS-KE is a key echange protocol proposed in 2014. The protocol SDH-XS-KE improves the "Strong Diffie-Hellman-DSA Key Exchange (called SDH-DSA-KE)" proposed by Jeong and al. in 2007 . First SDH-XS-KE is designed in finite groups such that Z/pZ where p is a prime number. So, in this paper, we present the elliptic curves version of the protocol SDH-XS-KE.
Introduction
The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol is the best known protocol in this field (Diffie & Hellman, 1976) . On the other hand, the basic protocol is vulnerable to many attacks. This is why many proposals have been made to improve the security of the DH protocol (Nyberg, 1994 & Krawczyk, 2005 . But, most of the proposals have been attacked or suffered weaknesses.
Related Work
In 2003, Law, Menezes, Qu, Solinas and Vanstone designed the MQV protocol in (Krawczyk, 2005) . The MQV protocol has been designed to achieve a remarkable list of security properties.
In 2005, Hugo Krawczyk show that MQV fails to a variety of attacks in Canetti-Krawczyk model (Canetti & Krawczyk, 2001 ) of key exchange that invalidate its basic security as well as many of its stated security goals. In (Krawczyk, 2005) , Krawczyk present HMQV, a carefully designed variant of MQV, that provides the same superb performance and functionality of the original protocol but for which all the MQV's security goals can be formally proved to hold in the random oracle model under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
In 2007, Jeong and al. proposed in (Jeong, Kwon & Lee, 2007 ) the "Strong Diffie-Hellman-DSA Key Exchange" (briefly: SDH-DSA-KE) where DSA signatures is used for mutual authentication but it is vulnerable to some attacks.
In 2014, Demba Sow and al. presented a cryptanalysis of SDH-DSA-KE (Sow, Camara & Sow, 2014) showing that it is not secure against KCI attacks and is vulnerable to disclosure to ephemeral and long-term CDH exponents. Next, they proposed "Strong Diffie-Hellman-Exponential-Schnorr Key Exchange" (briefly: SDH-XS-KE) which is an improvement of SDH-DSA-KE for efficiency and security. Their protocol use 4 exponents and is secure against Session State Reveal (SSR) attacks, Key independency attacks, Unknown-key share (UKS) attacks and Key-Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attacks.
In addition, SDH-XS-KE has the Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) property. For mutual authentication, instead of DSA signatures, they use a modified Schnorr Exponential protocol.
Our Contribution
First in (Sow, Camara & Sow, 2014) , "Strong Diffie-Hellman-Exponential-Schnorr Key Exchange" (SDH-XS-KE) is designed in group G where G = Z/pZ and p a prime number. In this paper, we propose the SDH-XS-KE protocol in elliptic curves.
Organization of the Paper
This paper is organize as follow:
• In section 2: we recall some definitions and results about elliptic curves (), Discrete Logarithm Problem over Elliptic curves (), Diffie-Hellman protocol over Elliptic curves (), Schnorr protocol over Elliptic curves () and security notions about key exchange protocols ().
• In section 3: first, we design SDH-XS-KE protocol over Elliptic curves. In additional, we show its performance and security.
Preliminaries

Elliptic Curves Over a Finite Field
Definition 1 Let F be a field.
• An elliptic curve E over F can be given by the so-called Weierstrass equation
where the coefficients a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 6 ∈ F and E has to be nonsingular.
• The set of F-rational points on E is defined by the set of points
where P ∞ is the point at infinity.
• The set of F-rational points on E by means of the chord-and-tangent process turns E(F) into an abelian group with P ∞ as the neutral element.
Definition 2 (Elliptic curves over a finite field F q ). Let F q be a field not of characteristic 2 or 3. Suppose a, b ∈ F q such that x 3 + ax + b has no multiple roots. The equation of the elliptic curve E can be transformed into the reduced Weierstrass form
where 4a 3 + 27b 2 0. When F q for some prime q > 3, such a curve will be denoted E q (a, b).
Theorem 1 (Hasse) Let E be an elliptic curve over F q . Then
Discret Logarithm Problem
Let E(K) an elliptic curve over a finite field K and a generator P of order q.
• The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is to determine the integer k, given rational points P and Q on E(K), and given that k * P = Q.
• The Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECCDH) is the following: given rational points
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Diffie-Hellman is a key exchange protocol invented in 1976 and presented in the article: New directions in cryptography (Diffie & Hellman, 1976 ).
Diffie-Hellman protocol over elliptic curve
• A selects an integer a such that 1 < a < q − 1, keeps it secret and sends [a]P to B.
• B selects an integer b such that 1 < b < q − 1, keeps it secret and sends [b]P to A
Schnorr Protocol
Schnorr Identification Protocol
Let E(K) be an elliptic curve over a finite field K and g ∈ E(K) be a point of order q.
In Schnorr identification protocol, sk is the secret key and a ∈ [1, q] is an integer. Take γ = [a]g and pk = (E(F p ), g, γ) the public key.
Let P the prover and V the verifier.
2. V takes an element "challenge" e Rand ← [1, q] and dispatchs e to P.
3. P computes s = x + ae mod q and dispatchs s to V.
Exponential Schnorr Identification Protocol
In Exponential Schnorr identification protocol, sk is the secret key and α ∈ [1, q] is an integer. Take γ = [α]g and pk = (E(F p ), g, γ) the public key. 3. V takes an element "challenge" e Rand ← [1, q] and dispatchs e to P.
4. P computes s = x + αe mod q and dispatchs S = sY to V.
We can prove that Exponential Schnorr identification is a proof of the "ability" of the prover P to calculate CDH(γ, Y) for all X ∈ G. The protocol is furthermore a zero knowledge for a verifier V that randomly takes e, (Krawczyk, 2005) .
Security Notions About Key Exchange Protocols
In this section, we will define security terms that key sharing protocols should check.
1. Key Independency. Independence of keys: this term means that the keys of sessions are computationally independent between them.
2. Session State Reveal Attack. this term means that the security of the session keys is ensured even if the attacker has access to the random numbers which made it possible to generate them.
3. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS): this term means that the attacker's knowledge of a long-term key must not compromise the progress of the protocol. • {x A , x B } and try to get the session key from the keys of previous sessions: this is PFS attack;
• {v A , v B } : this stems from the security to State reveal attack;
• {x A , v B } or {x B , v A } : this stems from the security to KCI attacks;
• x A x B · g without learning (x A , x B ): this stems from the security of the disclosure of long-term DH exponents;
• v A v B · g, without learning {v A , v B }: this follows from the security of the disclosure of ephemeral DH exponents;
The Protocol SDH-XS-KE Over Elliptic Curves
In the SDH-XS-KE protocol, modified Schnorr Exponential protocol provides mutual authentication between parties.
Design SDH-XS-KE Over Elliptic Curves
Let E(K) an elliptic curve over a finite field K, g ∈ E(K) a generator of order q and O the point at infinity. Let H :
l be a hash function (where l ≥ 224 and P is the set of all parties authorized to take part in the protocol). Let G :
l be a randomness extractor on E(K) and and H : {0, 1} l × P × P × {0, 1} → {0, 1} l be a hash function and
l be a keyed hash function for Mac authentication. • If any of the above checks do not match then Bob interrupts the flow of the protocol.
• Bob chooses a secret session's random v B < q, calculates V B = v B · g and
, destroy δ BA and dispatchs (V B , h MAC B ) to Alice; 3.
• Alice verifies if 
4.
• Bob calculates h 
SDH-XS-KE Over Elliptic Curves: Security and Performance
The modified Schnorr Exponential protocol has ensured mutual authentication between parties where their public keys are their challenges. The success of the protocol depends on the honesty of the participants who must select, use and save the values of the protocol parameters correctly. That said for the future that we assume the participants are honest.
Performance
In the SDH-XS-KE protocol, there is a key confirmation step and we used only 4 exponents and 4 passes. Thus, it is efficient (because faster) than SDH-DSA-KE where 5 exponents 4 passes are used.
Security
In (Sow, Camara & Sow, 2014) , the vulnerability to KCI attacks of the SDH-DSA-KE protocol is shown. In what follows, we will prove the security of the SDH-XS-KE protocol if there is the impossibility of calculating CDH (V A , V B ), CDH (y A , y B ), CDH (V A , y B ), CDH (V B , y A ) and if the hash function used is solid.
Theorem 2 The SDH-XS-KE protocol over elliptic curves has the Perfect Forward Secrecy property.
Proof There is a key confirmation step, plus the attacker can not participate in the session where the parties will create the session key. The only possibility that the attacker is to compute the session key directly if we suppose that he holds the keys in the long term in other words x A and x B . The session key is thus equal to K Bs = H(K B2 , id A , id B , 0) where 
to Bob and destroy δ AB ; Bob calculates
to Alice and destroy δ BA . Thus, the protocol fails if the attacker is active and does not know simultaneously v A and x A or v B and x B . So, the only possibility for the attacker is to directly calculate the session key, assuming he has access to Alice's long-term secret key (ie x A ) and the random value of Bob's session (ie v B ). 
So the session key is K Bs
= H(K B2 , id A , id B , 0) where K B2 = G(g KB , l) and g KB = (v A + x A )(v B + x B ) · g = v B · V A + x A · y B + x A · V B + x B · V= (v A + x A )(v B + x B ) · g = v A v B · g + x A x B · g + v B · y A + v A · y
Conclusion
We have successfully introduced the elliptic curve version of the SDH-XS-KE key exchange protocol using Schnorr's modified identification protocol for mutual authentication.
